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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to subtle
adversarial perturbations applied to the input. These ad-
versarial perturbations, though imperceptible, can easily
mislead the DNN. In this work, we take a control theoretic
approach to the problem of robustness in DNNs. We treat
each individual layer of the DNN as a nonlinear dynami-
cal system and use Lyapunov theory to prove stability and
robustness locally. We then proceed to prove stability and
robustness globally for the entire DNN. We develop empiri-
cally tight bounds on the response of the output layer, or any
hidden layer, to adversarial perturbations added to the input,
or the input of hidden layers. Recent works have proposed
spectral norm regularization as a solution for improving ro-
bustness against `2 adversarial attacks. Our results give new
insights into how spectral norm regularization can mitigate
the adversarial effects. Finally, we evaluate the power of our
approach on a variety of data sets and network architectures
and against some of the well-known adversarial attacks.
1. Introduction
The objective of a supervised learning task for the in-
put u ∈ Rd, and its associated target value y for a given
DNN denoted by Hθ(u), where θ is a set of parameters to
be learned during the training, is to classify the instance u
correctly such that y = Hθ(u). Recently, the research com-
munity has become interested in adversarial attacks, where
the adversary’s goal is to introduce a small amount of engi-
neered perturbation ∆ ∈ Rd to u, so that u′ = u+ ∆, while
still maintaining its similarity to u, can deceive the DNN
into making a mistake, i.e., Hθ(u+ ∆) 6= y. The adversary
is usually assumed to be constrained by an `p-norm so that
‖u′ − u‖`p ≤ , where  bounds the adversaries’ freedom to
alter the input. While this does not capture the full scope of
potential adversaries [4], attacks of this form have proven
difficult to prevent [32, 5, 2, 31]. While optimal defenses
have been developed for simple linear models [3, 24], the
over-parameterized nature of DNNs and the complexity of
surfaces learned during training make the development of
robust solutions against the adversary difficult [14].
In this work, we use Lyapunov theory of stability and ro-
bustness of nonlinear systems to develop a new understand-
ing of how DNNs respond to changes in their inputs, and
thus, to adversarial attacks under the `2 norm framework.
By treating each layer l in the DNN as a nonlinear system
hl, we develop a new framework which sets tight bounds on
the response of the individual layer to adversarial perturba-
tions (maximum changes in ‖hl(u)− hl(u+ ∆)‖22) based
on the spectral norm of the weights, ρ(Wl), of the individual
layer. We characterize Lyapunov properties of an individual
layer and their relationship to local and global stability and
robustness of the network. Since our analysis is based on a
sequence of nonlinear transformations hl=1,...,n, our method
is the first to bound the response to input alterations by the
attack parameter ∆l for any layer l in the DNN. For simple
forward networks (fully connected and convolutional), our
results show that an attack’s success is independent of the
depth of the DNN and that the spectral norm of the weight
matrix for the first and last layer of a network have the largest
effect on robustness. Our Lyapunov analysis of Residual
Blocks shows that the skip-connections of these blocks con-
tribute to their lack of robustness against adversarial attacks
[13] and that these blocks require more restrictive Lyapunov
conditions (a tighter spectral norm regularization) for main-
taining the same level of robustness. This may compromise
the DNN’s accuracy on the clean data set [34, 10]. Finally,
our proposed robust training method, unlike the previous
works in this arena [11, 28, 37, 8], regularizes the spectral
norm of the weight matrix at each individual layer based
on certain Lyapunov conditions, independently from other
layers. Our layer-wise spectral regularization parameters
may be selected based on our Lyapunov conditions and the
level of robustness and accuracy required for a specific task.
Our approach can help with the limitations associated with
expressiveness of DNNs trained with the same level of spec-
tral regularization across all layers [10]. We show that this
higher degree of freedom in selecting the hyper-parameters
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for each layer independently, leads to networks that are more
accurate and robust against adversarial attacks in compari-
son to the existing works in the literature.
In summary, our contributions revolve around showing
that adversarial ML research can leverage control theory to
understand and build defenses against strong adversaries.
This can accelerate the research progress in this area. We
prove that with our proposed training approach, the pertur-
bation to the final activation function (∆n ∈ Rd) is bounded
by ‖∆n‖2 ≤
√
c · , where c is a constant determined by the
hyper-parameters chosen and models the adversarial pertur-
bations. Our bound is tight, and applies to all possible inputs,
and to attacks applied at any layer of the network (input, or
hidden), with no distributional assumptions. Our analysis
shows how Residual Blocks can aid adversarial attacks, and
extensive empirical tests show that our approach’s defensive
advantages increase with the adversary’s freedom .
2. Related work
To provide certifiable defenses, complex optimization
schemes are usually adopted to show that all the data points
inside an `p ball around a sample data point have the same
prediction [36, 21, 7, 9]. The bounds provided by these
methods are usually loose, and the computational costs as-
sociated with them increase exponentially with the size of
the network. These approaches are only applicable to parts
of the input space for which feasible solutions exist. Works
such as [39] have empirically shown that bounding a layer’s
response to the input generally improves robustness. Works
such as [35, 40] focus on certifying robustness for a DNN
by calculating the bounds for the activation functions’ re-
sponses to the inputs. The closest to our work are the results
given in [11, 28, 37, 8]. [8] utilizes Lipschitz properties of
the DNN to improve robustness against adversarial attacks.
Unlike [8], our approach does not require a predetermined
set of hyper-parameters to prove robustness. Our analysis
provides a range of possible values which determine differ-
ent levels of robustness and may be selected per application.
Similarly, [28] empirically explores the benefits of bound-
ing the response of the DNN by regularizing the spectral
norm of layers based on the Lipschitz properties of the DNN.
These Lipschitz based approaches may be seen as one sub-
set of our Lyapunov based approach. As we will describe,
our Lyapunov based analysis is built upon a more general
input-output nonlinear mapping which does not necessarily
depend on restricting the networks’s Lipschitz property. [37]
explores the benefits of training networks with spectral regu-
larization for improving generalizability against input per-
turbations. However, their work bounds the spectral norm
of all layers by 1. As we will show, this approach limits
the performance on the clean data set and does not produce
the most robust DNN. [11] uses PAC-Bayes generalization
analysis to estimate the robustness of DNNs trained by spec-
tral regularization against adversarial attacks. The analysis
given in their work however, requires the same regulariza-
tion condition enforced across all layers of the DNN. Our
work provides per layer conditions for robustness, which
may be utilized for the selection of the best regularization
parameters for each layer independently, given a data set and
architecture through cross-validation. Although, we have not
empirically shown in the paper, our approach theoretically
should provide a level of robustness against intermediate
level attacks recently introduced in [18]. Our work provides
a theoretical backing for the empirical findings in [28, 36]
which state that Leaky ReLu, a modified version of the ReLu
function, may be more robust comparatively. Finally, only
one prior work has looked at control theory for adversarial
defense, but their method covered only a toy adversary con-
strained to perturbing the input by a constant [29].
3. Preliminaries and Motivation
In this work, we address the machine learning problem
of adversarial attacks on DNNs from a control theoretic
perspective. To aid in bridging the gap between these two
fields, we will briefly review the core control theory results
needed to understand our work, with further exposition in
Appendix A for less familiar readers. The design of stable
and robust systems that maintain their desired performance
in the presence of external noise and disturbance has been
studied in the control theory research literature. Our work is
based on the Lyapunov theory of stability and robustness of
nonlinear systems which dates back to more than a century
ago [22]. We treat each layer of the DNN as a nonlinear
system and model the DNN as a cascade connection of
nonlinear systems. A nonlinear system is defined as a system
which produces an output signal for a given input signal
through a nonlinear relationship. More specifically, consider
the following general definition for the nonlinear system H
(Fig. 1),
H :
{
x˙ = f(x, u)
y = h(x, u),
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rn, u ∈ U ⊆ Rm, and y ∈ Y ⊆ Rk are
respectively the state, input and output of the system, and
X , U and Y are the local state, input and output sub-spaces
around the current operating points. The nonlinear mappings
f and h model the relationship among the input signal u, the
internal states of the system x and the output signal y. To
help connect these control theory notations and definitions
to our analysis of DNN models, see Table 1.
The behavior of a layer inside the DNN may be modeled
as a nonlinear system defined above. More specifically, for
the layer l, the input signal u takes the size of the layer
l − 1 and stands for the input to the layer l before it is
transformed by the weights and biases. y has the size of
layer l and may be defined as the output of the layer l after
2
Table 1: A control theory to machine learning mapping.
Control Theory
Meaning
Context for our work
u Input of the nonlinear
system
Inputs to the DNN (e.g.,
image) or the inputs to a
hidden layer from the
previous layer
y Output of the
nonlinear system
Output of the DNN or
the output of any hidden
layer
x States of the nonlinear
system
Weights and biases of a
layer
x˙ Transient changes of
the states over discrete
or continuous steps
Changes of the weights
and biases during t
training steps
f(.) Nonlinear function
modeling the transient
changes of the states
of the system based on
the previous state and
current input
Models the updates
applied to the weights’
and biases’ of a layer
over the t training steps
h(.) Nonlinear function
modeling the
steady-state behavior
of the system given the
current state and input
Models the input-output
relationship of a hidden
layer given the current
values of weights, biases
and input
ρ, ν Lyapunov parameters
modeling the
input-output behavior
(robustness and
stability properties) of
the system (explained
in Subsection 4.3)
Values determining the
extent of spectral
regularization enforced
at a layer given the
desired level of
robustness and accuracy
(Theorem 3, Corollary 2)
the activation functions. The weights and biases of the DNN
are the states of the nonlinear systems. In this vein, h and f
are general functions which model the relationship between
the states x, and the nonlinear transformation applied to the
input of the layer u to produce the output y of the layer after
activation functions. The states are dynamically updated
through gradient descent, given the inputs from the training
data set during the training iterations t. x˙l is the derivative
taken over training iterations indicating that the weights
and biases are changing during training, and f models this
nonlinear behavior during the training iterations. Please see
Appendix A for further details.
Our analysis is based on Lyapunov theory which gives
us the freedom to define stability and robustness purely
based on the input-output relationship of the layers with-
out the exact knowledge of the internal state changes x˙ (i.e.,
we do not need to know the specific weight and bias val-
ues). More specifically, Lyapunov theory combined with
the fact that we are showing bounded-input-bounded-output
(BIBO) stability and robustness of the layer, allows us to
abstract out the transient behavior of the nonlinear systems
during the training iterations t, i.e., x˙l(t) = fl(xl(t), ul(t))
where xl(t) = {Wl(t), Bl(t)}, from the robustness analy-
sis and focus only on the steady-state behavior of the non-
linear system, i.e., the input-output mapping of the layer,
yl = hl(xl, ul) = hl({Wl, Bl}, ul) where hl(.) models the
nonlinear transformation. By analyzing hl(.), we can derive
robust conditions to be enforced during training for the states
of a layer {Wl, Bl}.
Next, we define an input-output stability and robustness
Lyapunov criterion for a nonlinear system. A nonlinear
system is said to be BIBO stable, if it produces bounded
outputs for bounded input signals. A nonlinear system is said
to be stable and robust, if it produces bounded output signals
that are close in the Euclidean space, when their respective
input signals are also close enough in the Euclidean space
[22]. Mathematically, these definitions can be represented
as follows,
Definition 1 [22] System H is instantaneously incremen-
tally finite-gain (IIFG) `2-stable and robust, if for any two
inputs u1, u2 ∈ U , there exists a positive gain γ, such that
the relation,
||y2 − y1||`2 ≤ γ||u2 − u1||`2 .
holds. Here, ||y2 − y1||`2 and ||u2 − u1||`2 represent the
Frobenius `2-norm of the input signals u1 and u2 and their
respective output signals y1 and y2.
If a system is IIFG stable and robust, then the changes in the
output of the entire system are bounded by the changes in the
input of the entire system. As a result, if the changes in the
input are minuscule, which is the assumption for the majority
of `2 adversarial attacks, then the changes in their respective
outputs are also minuscule. This is the exact behavior that
we would like to encourage for each layer of the DNN so
that the entire network is robust against adversarial attacks.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the relationship given
in Definition 1 is more general than enforcing Lipschitz con-
tinuity. In particular, the above relationship should only hold
locally for the input signals u1 and u2 for the DNN to be
IIFG. Further, the above assumption does not place any con-
straints on the initial conditions of the DNN. Additionally,
Lipschitz continuity implies uniform continuity, but the re-
lationship given above potentially allows for discontinuous
distributions and does not enforce any continuously differen-
tiable condition on the mapping from the input to the output
of the DNN [22, 12, 19]. Finally, we will show that the en-
forcement of the relationship given in Definition 1 locally at
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Figure 1: A nonlinear system (top). The DNN modeled as a
cascade of nonlinear systems (bottom).
the layer level is not necessary. We will show that by enforc-
ing a much looser condition at each layer, we can encourage
the behavior given in Definition 1 globally for the DNN.
Lyapunov theory of dissipativity provides a fundamental
framework for the stability and robustness analysis of sys-
tems based on a generalized notion of the ”energy” supplied
and dissipated in the system [22]. This generalized notion
of ”energy” is defined based on a relationship that solely re-
lies on the input and output of the system. This theory states
that a passive system which dissipates energy is robust and
stable. The benefit of this approach is that by only enforcing
a relationship between the input and output of the DNN, we
can define a measure of stability and robustness for the en-
tire DNN against adversarial attacks and characterize robust
conditions for the states of the DNN (weights and biases).
This is done by first defining an input-output mapping which
characterizes a specific relationship between the input and
output of the layers inside the DNN and then enforcing that
the relationship should hold for the DNN for all the inputs
supplied to the model and the outputs produced by the model
during training so that the same will hold during inference.
The following definition provides the mathematical repre-
sentation of the aforementioned concept,
Definition 2 [38] System H is considered to be instanta-
neously Incrementally Input Feed-Forward Output Feedback
Passive (IIFOFP), if it is dissipative with respect to the input-
output mapping ω(·, ·),
ω(u2 − u1, y2 − y1) = (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1)
− δ(y2 − y1)T (y2 − y1)− ν(u2 − u1)T (u2 − u1),
for some value ν ∈ R and δ ∈ R where ν × δ ≤ 0.25.
Remark 2 Although ν and δ may take negative or positive
values, our goal is to design layers that have positive δ’s.
Further, a positive set of δ and ν for a layer implies IIFG
stability and robustness for that layer. Nevertheless, as we
will show, for the entire network to be robust and stable, the
ν and δ for an individual layer can take any value as long as
certain conditions are met. ν and δ define a range of possible
stability and robustness properties for a system. The lack of
stability and robustness in one layer may be compensated for
by an excess of robustness and stability in another layer [22].
In Subsection 4.3, we provide an interpretation of the above
relations and outline the implications behind the selection of
ν and δ.
Theorem 1 [22] If the nonlinear system H is IIFOFP with
δ > 0, then it is IIFG stable and robust with the finite gain
γ = 1δ .
Our goal in this paper is to connect Definition 2 to Definition
1 to achieve robustness and the property given in Theorem
1. By enforcing the looser condition given in Definition 2,
where ν and δ can take a range of values locally at the layer
level, we encourage a robust global behavior for the entire
DNN as given in Definition 1. According to Lyapunov theory
for a layer to have the instantaneously IIFOFP property in
Definition 2, the following condition should hold for the
input-output mapping of all the inputs u1, u2 fed to the layer
and their respective output signals y1, y2: ω(u2 − u1, y2 −
y1) > 0 [22]. If this holds, then the layer is dissipative
with respect to the nonlinear relation given in Definition 2.
Our results will show how we can reach Definition 1 and
robustness globally by enforcing Definition 2 locally. Lastly,
we will use the following matrix properties in our proofs,
Theorem 2 [20] A square matrix A is a quasi-dominant
matrix (diagonally dominant), if there exists a positive di-
agonal matrix P = diag{p1, p2, ..., pn} such that aiipi ≥∑
j 6=i |aij |pj , ∀i, and/or ajjpj ≥
∑
i 6=j |aji|pi, ∀j. If
these inequalities are met strictly, then the matrix is said
to be strictly row-sum (or column-sum) quasi-dominant. If
P can be chosen as the identity matrix, then the matrix is
said to be row- or column- diagonally dominant.
Corollary 1 [33] Every symmetric quasi-dominant matrix
is positive definite.
4. Theoretical Analysis and Main Results
In our analysis, we treat each layer of the DNN as a non-
linear system as defined in Section 3 i.e., Hi for all layers
i = 1, ..., n (Fig. 1). A nonlinear system is defined as a layer
in the network that accepts an input vector from the previous
layer and produces an output vector with the size of the cur-
rent layer after the weights, biases and activation functions
are applied to the input signal. We prove the conditions under
which each layer Hi is instantaneously IIFOFP with specific
hyper-parameters δi and νi. One can interpret the values of
δi and νi as measures of robustness for the specific layer i.
Our results place specific constraints on the weight matrices
at the given layer based on the values of the hyper-parameters
δi and νi. We train the model and enforce these conditions
during back-propagation. Consequently, we can show that
the entire DNN is instantaneously IIFOFP and IIFG stable
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and robust. This means that the DNN maintains a level of
robustness against adversarial changes added to the input for
up to a specific adversarial `2 norm . This is because the
changes in the output of the DNN are now bounded by the
changes introduced to the input by the adversary. Robust-
ness in this sense means that the adversary now needs to add
a larger amount of noise to the input of the DNN in order to
cause larger changes in the output of the DNN and affect the
decision making process. Our approach improves robustness
against adversarial changes added to the input signal and the
output of a hidden layer before it is fed into the next layer.
In our approach, we consider Leaky ReLU activation
functions. Our results and the Lyapunov theory suggest that
Leaky ReLU is a more robust activation function than ReLu.
We expand on this in Subsection 4.3. ∆ is a measure for
intervention. ∆ models the extent of adversarial noise in-
troduced to the input by the adversary. The effects of the
majority of -based attacks of different norms such as the
fast gradient method (FGM) and projected gradient descent
(PGD) method may be modeled by ∆ [23, 25, 26]. Given a
DNN, we are interested in the (local) robustness of an arbi-
trary natural example u by ensuring that all of its neighbor-
hood has the same inference outcome. The neighborhood of
u may be characterized by an `2 ball centered at u. We can
define an adversarial input as follows,
Definition 3 Consider the input u of the layer of size n,
i.e., u ∈ Rn and the perturbed input signal u + ∆ where
∆ ∈ Rn is the attack vector that can take any value. The
perturbed input vector u+∆ is within a ∆0-bounded `2-ball
centered at u if u + ∆ ∈ B2(u,∆0), where B2(u,∆0) :=
{u+ ∆| ||u+ ∆− u||2 = ||∆||2 ≤ ∆0}.
Geometrically speaking, the minimum distance of a mis-
classified nearby instance to u is the smallest adversarial
strength needed to alter the DNN’s prediction, which is also
the largest possible robustness measure for u. We will use
the conic behavior of the activation function, spectral norm
of the weights and their relation to Lyapunov theory to train
DNNs that are stable and robust against the adversary.
4.1. The robustness analysis of each layer inside the
deep neural network
Each layer of a DNN can be modeled as yl = hl(Wlul +
bl) for l = 1, ..., n for some n > 2, where ul ∈ Rn′l−1 is the
input of the l-th layer, and Wl ∈ Rn′l×n′l−1 and bl ∈ Rn′l
are respectively the layer-wise weight matrix and bias vec-
tor applied to the flow of information from the layer l − 1
to the layer l. hl : Rn
′
l−1 → Rn′l models the entire nu-
merical transformation at the l-th layer including the (non-
linear) activation functions. n′l−1 and n
′
l represent the num-
ber of neurons in layers l − 1 and l. For a set of weight
and bias parameters, {Wl, bl}nl=1, we can model the be-
havior of the entire DNN as H{Wl,bl}nl=1(u1) = yn where
H{Wl,bl}nl=1 : R
n′1 → Rn′n and u1 is the initial input to
the DNN. Given the training data set of size K, (ui, yi)Ki=1,
where ui ∈ Rn′1 and yi ∈ Rn′n , the loss function is defined
as 1KL(H{Wl,bl}nl=1(ui), yi), where L is usually selected to
be cross-entropy or the squared `2-distance for classification
and regression tasks, respectively. The model parameters
to be learned is x. We consider the problem of obtaining
a model that is insensitive to the perturbation of the input.
The goal is to obtain parameters, {Wl, bl}nl=1, such that the
`2-norm of h(u + ∆) − h(u) is small, where u ∈ Rn′1 is
an arbitrary vector and ∆ ∈ Rn′1 is an engineered perturba-
tion vector with a small `2-norm added by the adversary. To
be more general and further investigate the properties of the
layers, we assume that each activation function, modeled by
hl is a modified version of element-wise ReLU called the
Leaky ReLU: hl(yl) = max(yl, ayl), where 0 < a < 1 (our
results stand for simple ReLu as well). It follows that, to
bound the variations in the output of the DNN by the vari-
ations in the input, it suffices to bound these variations for
each l ∈ {1, ..., n}. Here, we consider that the attack varia-
tions ∆ are added by the adversary into the initial input or
the input of the hidden layers. This motivates us to consider
a new form of regularization scheme, which is based on an
individual layer’s Lyapunov property. The first question we
seek to answer is the following: what are the conditions un-
der which a layer l is IIFOFP with a positive δl and a νl that
may take any value? In practice, it is best to train layers so
that both νl and δl are positive, as this means a tighter bound
and a more robust layer (Subsection 4.3), however, this is
not a necessary condition for our results.
Theorem 3 The numerical transformation at the hidden
layer l of the DNN as defined in Subsection 4.1 is instanta-
neously IIFOFP and consequently IIFG stable and robust, if
the spectral norm of the weight matrix for the layer satisfies
the following condition,
ρ(Wl) ≤ 1
δ2l
+
2|νl|
δl
where ρ(Wl) is the spectral norm of the weight matrix at the
layer l, and the hyper-parameters δl > 0 and νl meet the
condition δl × νl ≤ 0.25.
Proof in Appendix B
Remark 3 It is important to note that the above theorem
shows a relationship between the spectral norm of the weight
matrix at the layer l and instantaneously IIFG stability and
robustness of the layer as defined in the Definition 1 and
Theorem 1 through the hyper-parameters δl and νl. Namely,
a larger value for νl leads to a larger upper-bound for the
spectral norm of the weight matrix at layer l. Larger values
of δl however, have a reciprocal relation to the spectral norm
of the weight matrix. The relationship between parameters δl,
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νl and the spectral norm of the weight matrix may be utilized
during the robust training of DNNs through the spectral
regularization enforced at each layer.
We can implement the above condition for each layer dur-
ing the training of the network. If the above condition is
met for each layer, then we can posit that the DNN is sta-
ble and robust in Lyapunov sense. The exact measure of
stability and robustness depends on the selection of δl and
νl. The global effects of this choice are outlined in Subsec-
tion 4.2. The extension of Theorem 3 to convolutional layers
follows in a similar pattern and is given in Appendix C. Ap-
pendix D includes the robustness analysis of ResNet build-
ing blocks. It is important to note that νl and δl are design
hyper-parameters that are selected before the training starts.
The only real conditions placed on the hyper-parameters are
that δl should be positive and δl × νl ≤ 0.25. The exact im-
plications of choosing the hyper-parameters and their effects
on the robustness of the layer against adversarial noise are
detailed in Subsection 4.3.
4.2. The robustness analysis of the entire Deep Neu-
ral Network
Theorem 4 Consider the cascade interconnection of hidden
layers inside the DNN as given in Fig. 1 where n > 2, and
each layer Hl for l = 1, ..., n is instantaneously IIFOFP
with their respective νl and δl as defined in Theorem 3, i.e.,
for any two incremental inputs ul1, ul2 for the layer l we
have,
ω(ul2 − ul1, yl2 − yl1) = (ul2 − ul1)T (yl2 − yl1)
− δl(yl2 − yl1)T (yl2 − yl1)− νl(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1),
as the nonlinear input-output mapping of the layer where
ω(ul2 − ul1, yl2 − yl1) > 0. Then the entire DNN is also
instantaneously IIFOFP with the hyper-parameters ν, δ and
input-output mapping,
ω(u2 − u1, y2 − y1) = (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1)
− δ(y2 − y1)T (y2 − y1)− ν(u2 − u1)T (u2 − u1),
where u1 and u2 are the initial inputs to the DNN and y1
and y2 are their respective output signals, if the matrix −A
is quasi-dominant, where A is defined as,
A =

ν − ν1 12 0 . . . − 12
1
2 −δ1 − ν2 12 . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 . . . 12 −δn−1 − νn 12− 12 0 . . . 12 δ − δn
 .
Proof in Appendix E
Remark 4 For the DNN to be IIFOFP with δ > 0 and
ν > 0 and consequently stable and robust, we need to set
the hyper-parameters for training such that δl > 0 for l =
1, ..., n, δn > δ > 0, ν1 > 0, and ν1 > ν > 0. The rest of
νl’s are selected such that the matrix −A is quasi-dominant.
Note that theoretically, the δl’s or νl’s for some hidden layers
may take negative values, as long as the matrix −A stays
quasi-dominant, i.e., δl + νl+1 > 1 for l = 1, ..., n − 1
and δn−1 + νn > 1. By selecting the hyper-parameters
according to Theorem 4, one is indirectly setting the spectral
regularization rule for each layer. Appendix F details an
example on the selection of these hyper-parameters.
Theorem 4 points to an interesting fact that the first and last
hidden layer may have the largest effect on the robustness of
the DNN. To keep the matrix −A quasi-dominant, δ and ν
have a direct dependence on the values of δn and ν1. Next,
we can characterize a relationship between the incremental
changes in the input signals of a DNN, i.e., ∆1, and their
effects on the output of the DNN, i.e., ∆n.
Corollary 2 Consider the cascade interconnection of hid-
den layers inside the DNN as given in Fig. 1 where n > 2, if
each layer Hl is instantaneously IIFOFP with their respec-
tive νi and δi, and the DNN is trained to meet the conditions
given in Theorem 4, then the entire DNN is also instanta-
neously IIFOFP with its respective ν and δ and the input-
output mapping ω(u2−u1, y2−y1) = (u2−u1)T (y2−y1)−
δ(y2−y1)T (y2−y1)−ν(u2−u1)T (u2−u1) where δ > 0.
One can show that the variations in the final output of the
entire DNN (∆n) are upper-bounded (limited) by the varia-
tions in the input signal (∆1) through the following relation,
||∆n||22 ≤
(
1
δ2
+
2ν
δ
)
||∆1||22 =
(
1
δ2
+
2ν
δ
)
2
where the design parameter δ and ν are both positive.
Proof in Appendix G
4.3. The conic interpretation of the proposed ap-
proach
ΔY
ΔU
r
c
a
b
Figure 2: A depiction of the in-
terior conic behavior of a non-
linear system.
[38] was the first work
that connected Lyapunov
notion of stability and
robustness to the conic-
ity (bounded-ness) behav-
ior of the input-output map-
ping of a nonlinear system.
According to [38], a non-
linear numerical transfor-
mation is stable, if it pro-
duces bounded outputs for
bounded inputs. The same
nonlinear transformation is also robust, if it produces out-
puts that are insensitive to small changes added to the input.
A stable and robust nonlinear numerical transformation then
exhibits a conic behavior.
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According to [38], a nonlinear transformation exhibits a
conic behavior, if the mapping between the changes in the
input and the respective changes in the output, given the non-
linear transformation, always fits inside a conic sector on the
input-output plane i.e., a conic nonlinear numerical transfor-
mation in the Hilbert space is one whose input changes ∆u
and output changes ∆y are restricted to some conic sector of
the ∆U ×∆Y inner product space as given in Fig. 2. This
conic behavior is usually defined by the center line of the
cone c and the radius r:
Definition 4 [38] A relation H is interior conic, if there are
real constants r ≥ 0 and c for which ||∆y − c∆u||`2 ≤
r||∆u||`2 is satisfied.
This is the exact behavior that we are encouraging for each
layer of the DNN so that the outputs of each layer become
insensitive to small changes in the input. In particular, we
have ∆u = ∆1, ∆y = ∆n, c = a+b2 and r =
b−a
2 where
a and b are the slopes of the lower and upper bounds of the
cone, and c and r are the center and radius of the cone. One
can show that,
(∆n − c∆1)T (∆n − c∆1) ≤ r2∆T1 ∆1
→ (∆n − (a+ b
2
)∆1)
T (∆n − (a+ b
2
)∆1)
≤ (b− a
2
)2∆T1 ∆1 → 0 ≤ ∆T1 ∆n
− ( 1
a+ b
)∆Tn∆n − (
ba
a+ b
)∆T1 ∆1.
Hence by selecting δ = 1a+b and ν =
ba
b+a , we are bounding
the output changes by the changes in the input as depicted in
Fig. 2 and by that, we make the numerical transformations
occurring at each layer of the DNN insensitive to small
changes in the input. Particularly, a positive δ implies b > 0
with a larger δ implying a smaller positive b and a larger
distance between the slope of the upper-bound of the cone
and the ∆Y axis. This implies that ∆Y increases in a slower
rate with increases in ∆U . A positive ν implies a > 0
with a larger ν implying a larger a and a larger distance
between the lower-bound of the cone and the ∆U axis [22].
We are encouraging the pair (∆1,∆n) to be instantaneously
confined to a sector of the plane as depicted. The conic
interpretation described here combined with the results given
in the previous sections support the findings presented in [28,
36] that the use of Leaky Relu activation in the architecture
of DNNs may contribute to robustness.
5. Experiments
We validate our results by performing a diverse set of
experiments on a variety of architectures (fully-connected,
AlexNet, ResNet) and data sets (MNIST, CIFAR10, SVHN
and ImageNet). Appendix L contains the details on hyper-
parameters and training process for the above architecture
and data set combinations. The experiments are implemented
in TensorFlow [1] and the code will be made readily avail-
able. We test the DNNs against the fast gradient method
(FGM) attack [15] with Frobenius `2 norm of  ∈ [0.1, 0.4],
and the iterative projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
[25] with 100 iterations, α = 0.02 and the same range of
epsilons. Further, we show in Appendix J that our approach
provides improved robustness against the Carlini & Wagner
(C&W) attack [6].
Table 2: The incremental output variations (∆n) for the 3
layer forward-net given an attack strength and the bounds
calculated according to Corollary 2 (MNIST, PGD attack)
Mean output change ‖∆n‖2 ≤ Lyapunov Bound
Lyapunov Parameters  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 0.244 ≤ 0.435 0.490 ≤ 0.615 0.736 ≤ 0.753
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 0.202 ≤ 0.407 0.406 ≤ 0.576 0.610 ≤ 0.706
δ = 1.1, ν = 0.22 0.170 ≤ 0.352 0.340 ≤ 0.497 0.511 ≤ 0.609
Base Model 1.233 2.446 3.641
Our robust Lyapunov training method regularizes the
spectral norm of a layer l so that, ρ(Wl) ≤ β where
β = 1
δ2l
+ 2|νl|δl . Given n layers, one can pick n different
combinations of (ρl, νl) for a given data set and architecture
as long as the conditions given in Theorem 3, Theorem 4
and Remark 4 are met. Our proofs tell us that if we wish
to constrain the adversarial perturbations, we should set the
values of (ρ1, ν1) and (ρn, νn) with more care. The values
of (ρi, νi), for 1 < i < n, however, may be selected more
freely to allow for a greater flexibility to learn while not giv-
ing the adversary further advantage. Appendix F outlines
the process for selecting the Lyapunov hyper-parameters ac-
cording to our proofs. The different sets of Lyapunov design
parameters used in our experiments are detailed in Appendix
H. We represent a robust DNN with its global Lyapunov
parameters (δ, ν). It is important to note that the greater
flexibility (higher expressiveness [10]) allowed for the inter-
mediate layers leads to a better generalization on the clean
and adversarial data sets. This is not true for DNNs trained
by weight-decay or spectral norm regularization against a
single threshold β. All the previous works on this subject
[11, 28, 37, 8], keep β constant across layers. These harder
constraints over-regularize and thus impair the DNNs ability
against attacks. Our results outlined in Appendix K show
that our Lyapunov DNNs are more robust and perform better
in comparison to the aforementioned works.
Table 2 details the effectiveness of our approach in bound-
ing the incremental changes in the output of the DNN caused
by the attack. The results show that the proposed bounds of-
fered in Corollary 1 are met. Our bounds are never violated,
however as  gets larger, the output changes get closer to
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our proposed bounds. Given the empirically tightness of the
bounds, one may be able to a-priori determine the worst case
vulnerabilities against an attack for a network. We leave this
to our future work in this area. When we consider the accu-
racy under attack, our Lyapunov approach dominates prior
baselines. [11] for instance, obtained an accuracy of 62%
at  = 0.1 with adversarial training on CIFAR10 under the
`2 PGD adversary with a lower number of iterations. Our
approach obtains an accuracy of ≥ 73% at  = 0.1 and still
dominates with an accuracy of ≥ 63% at  = 0.4 (Table 11
in Appendix I). Fig. 3 reports the CIFAR10 test accuracy un-
der the iterative PGD and FGM attacks for different values
of . As noted in Section 4, DNNs trained with larger global
(δ, ν) maintain their robustness in a more consistent way for
larger ’s. This is because enforcing a larger global (δ, ν)
leads to DNNs with a more restricted conic behavior able to
more effectively bound the negative effects of the adversarial
noise. `2 weight decay training seems ineffective against the
attacks and cannot utilize adversarial training to improve its
performance (Fig. 4 in Appendix I). Lastly, to show that our
approach scales to larger architectures and data sets, Table 3
represents our results for Lyapunov-based robust ResNet50
architectures trained on the ImageNet data set. A compre-
hensive set of results for a larger set of experiments is given
in Appendix I. This appendix also includes our mathemati-
cal proofs on how Lyapunov based spectral regularization of
the weights can improve the robustness of residual blocks.
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
`2 Attacker Strength 
δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22
Baseline
`2 Reg
Figure 3: Accuracy of the DNN under PGD attack (k = 100
iterations) (top) and FGM attack (bottom) using AlexNet on
CIFAR10. Plots share the same legend and axis.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the robustness of forward, con-
volutional, and residual layers against adversarial attacks
Table 3: Experiment results for ResNet50 trained on the
ImageNet dataset under the FGM attack
Network Type
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 0.61 0.51 0.44 0.38
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29 0.60 0.51 0.43 0.37
δ = 0.74, ν = 0.33 0.60 0.50 0.42 0.36
Base Training 0.57 0.45 0.40 0.34
Base Training
with Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
0.58 0.46 0.39 0.32
based on Lyapunov theory of stability and robustness. We
proposed a new robust way of training which improves ro-
bustness and allows for independent selection of the regu-
larization parameters per layer. Our work bounds the layers’
response to the adversary and gives more insights into how
different architectures, activation functions, and network de-
signs behave against attacks.
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A. Brief Primer on Control Theory
Stability and Robustness of nonlinear systems have been studied in the field of control theory for more than a century. A
nonlinear system is said to be stable, if given an input signal to the system, it can produce outputs that are expected by the user.
A nonlinear system is said to be stable and robust, if given an input signal to the system and in the presence of external noise
and disturbance, it can produce outputs that are expected by the user. In our work, we focus on bounded-input-bounded-output
(BIBO) stability of nonlinear systems. Definition 1 in Preliminaries provides the mathematical definition for incremental BIBO
stability. The Definition shows that the difference between two incremental outputs of the system should be bounded by the
difference between their respective incremental inputs times γ. γ is a positive constant (gain) indicating the extent of bounded-
ness property of the system. A small γ points to a more stable and robust system behavior. Our goal is to design a stable
system that produces bounded outputs for the bounded signals it receives. In other words, we want to design a stable system
that produces outputs close to the desired behavior defined by the user for the inputs from the domain of possible inputs. For
instance, a DNN trained on the Imagenet data set is stable, if it produces desired classification decisions for any input image
similar to the images in Imagenet data set. In our work, we focus on both stability and robustness. A robust stable DNN should
be able to produce outputs close to the desired behavior defined by the user for the inputs from the domain possible inputs in
cases where some amount noise has been added to the inputs. In our case, this noise is added by the adversary to the inputs.
A nonlinear system, given an input, state and output, is mathematically defined as follows,
H :
{
x˙ = f(x, u)
y = h(x, u),
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rn, u ∈ U ⊆ Rm, and y ∈ Y ⊆ Rk are respectively the state, input and output of the system, and X , U
and Y are the local state, input and output sub-spaces around the current operating points. The nonlinear mappings f and h
model the relationship among the input signal u, the internal states of the system x and the output signal y. For a DNN trained
on the ImageNet data set, U represents the images in the train and test data sets, Y represents the domain of possible class
decisions, and X represents the domain of possible weight and bias values that could be assigned to the DNN’s weights and
biases. Further, x, u and y represents the possible realizations of these domains. As an example, x can represent the values
assigned to the weights and biases of the DNN after training and convergence.
x˙ = f(x, u) represents the dynamic behavior of the DNN during training, where u represents the training inputs to the
DNN, and f models the updates to the states of the DNN during the t training iterations. This is also called the transient
behavior of the system and x˙ is a derivative taken over training iterations modeling the fact that the weights and biases are
changing during training. In control theory, the transient behavior of a system is defined as the system’s behavior before it
reaches the stable equilibrium (steady-state). Lyapunov theory provides the foundation for defining stability and robustness for
nonlinear systems solely based on their input-ouput behavior. This means that we can use Lyapunov results to define stability
and robustness criteria for the system using the desired steady-state behavior y = h(x, ul) = hl({W,B}, u). This in return
will determine the properties that the states (weights and biases) of the DNN should exhibit after the training is over.
Lyapunov theory treats the input-output relationship as an energy based concept and proves that if the input-output behavior
of a nonlinear systems meets the relationship given in Definition 2 then the system is stable and robust. Lyapunov theory states
that a stable and robust nonlinear system dissipate energy and as a results they have to be dissipative with respective to the
relationship given in Definition 2.
In our work, we treat each layer inside a DNN as a nonlinear system, and use the relationship given in Definition 2, to
characterize the conditions which the weights and biases of the layer should meet for that layer to be stable and robust. We
make sure that these conditions are met during training so that once the training is over, the layer is stable and robust. Further,
we define conditions under which the entire cascade of the systems (the entire DNN) is stable and robust and we make sure that
these condition are met after the training as well. As a result, we can provide a set of design options for spectral regularization
of the weights for each layer inside the DNN, and bound the response of each layer and eventually the response of the entire
network against adversarial attacks and the adversarial noise added to the inputs. Given our results, we can train DNNs that
outperform other state-of-the-art robust solutions in the current literature.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Given Definition 2, we can show that for the two incremental inputs to the layer l, i.e., ul,1 = ul and ul,2 = ul+∆l we have,
ω(ul + ∆l − ul, h(Wl[ul + ∆l] + bl)− h(Wlul + bl))
= ∆Tl ΛlWl∆l −∆Tl (νlIl)∆l −∆Tl WTl ΛTl (δlIl)ΛlWl∆l (1)
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where,
Λl =

1 0 . . . . . . . . .
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . 1 0
...
... 0 a
. . .
...
. . . . . . 0
. . . . . . 0 a

.
and Il is a diagonal identity matrix of size layer l. Further for a layer to be instantaneously IIFOFP with some νl and a
positive δl, one needs to show the following,
0 ≤ [ul + ∆l − ul]T [hl(ul + ∆l)− hl(ul)]
− δl[hl(ul + ∆l)− hl(ul)]T [hl(ul + ∆l)− hl(ul)]
− νl[ul + ∆l − ul]T [ul + ∆l − ul]
Given (1) and for δl > 0, the above can be represented as,
0 ≤ ( 1
2δl
+ |νl|)||∆l||22 −
δl
2
||ΛlWl∆l||22 (2)
Further, the following properties hold, ||ΛlWl∆l||22 < ||Λl||22||Wl||22||∆l||22, and since 0 < a < 1, we have ||Λl||22 <
λmax(Λ
T
l Λl) ≤ 1 where λmax(.) stands for the largest eigenvalue (singular value) of a matrix. Also we can show that
ρ(Wl) < ||Wl||22 < ρ(Wl) + σ where ρ(Wl) is the spectral radius of Wl and σ is a small positive number. Simplifying (2)
further we have,
0 ≤ ( 1
2δl
+ |νl|)||∆l||22 −
δl
2
||ΛlWl∆l||22
≤ ( 1
2δl
+ |νl|)||∆l||22 −
δl
2
||Λl||22||Wl||22||∆l||22
≤ ( 1
2δl
+ |νl|)||∆l||22 −
δl
2
[(ρ(Wl) + σ)||∆l||22]
≈ [ 1
2δl
+ |νl| − δl
2
ρ(Wl)]||∆l||22 (3)
For the relation (3) to be positive, the term inside the bracket needs to be positive. This gives us a measure for spectral
regularization of the weights between each two hidden layers of a DNN. For layer l we have,
ρ(Wl) ≤ 1
δ2l
+
2|νl|
δl
,
which proves the theorem.
C. Robustness analysis of a convolutional layer
The transformations before the activation functions at the convolutional layers are linear, and the same isomorphism as for
the linear layers can be exploited for the convolutional layers to have the same final relationships as given in Theorem 3. More
specifically, we can follow the steps given in [16] to define the transformation occurring at a convolutional layer l for output
feature i with any padding and stride design as,
φconvl,i (ul,i) =
Ml−1∑
j=1
fj,i ∗ ul,j,i + bl,i
Each fj,i is a filter applied to the input feature and each ul,j,i is an input feature map from the previous layer. bl,i is an
appropriately shaped biased tensor adding the same value to every element resulting from the convolutions. Ml−1 is the number
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of feature maps in the previous layer. One can represent the above relation as a matrix-vector multiplication by defining the
serialized version of the input, Ul,i = [ul,1,i, ..., ul,Ml−1,i] and then representing the filter coefficients in the form of a doubly
block circulant matrix [30]. Specifically, if Fj,i is a matrix that encompasses convolution of fj,i with the j-th feature map in a
vector form, then to represent convolutions associated with different input feature maps and the same output feature map i.e.,
fj,i’s over Ml−1 input features, one can horizontally concatenate the filter matrices to define Fi = [F1,i, F2,i, ..., FMl−1,i].
Then the complete transformation performed by a convolutional layer to generateMl output feature maps can be represented as,
hl(Ul) = hl(WUl +Bl)
where,
W =
 F1,1 . . . FMl−1,1... . . . ...
F1,Ml . . . FMl−1,Ml

and where vector Bl is the larger version of bli’s for all input feature maps and Ul = [Ul,1, ..., Ul,Ml−1 ]. Consequently,
the spectral norm of W should meet the conditions given in Theorem 3 for the layer l to be IIFOFP and IIFG stable with
bounded incremental outputs. We use the power iteration method to estimate the spectral norm of the weight matrix at a
specific layer during training as proposed in [11]. Further, the pooling layers inside a DNN do not affect the conic behavior of
the sub-systems given the properties of conic systems as described in [38]. More specifically, depending on how the pooling
layer is designed, an adjustment is made to the `2 norm of the incremental output changes for the sub-system containing the
pooling layer. Max (average) pooling decreases the norm of the changes and as a a result the conditions given in (2) is still met
after the pooling layer.
D. Robustness analysis of a ResNet building block
The following represents the input-output mapping of a building block l for incremental inputs ul2, ul1 and outputs yl2, yl1
in a ResNet layer [17], where yli = uli + F(uli, {Wl}),
Ml = (ul2 − ul1)T (yl2 − yl1)− δl(yl2 − yl1)T (yl2 − yl1)− νl(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1)
= (ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 + F2 − ul1 −F1)− δl(ul2 + F2 − ul1 −F1)T (ul2 + F2 − ul1 −F1)
− νl(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1)
= (ul2 − ul1)T (F2 −F1)− δl(ul2 + F2 − ul1 −F1)T (ul2 + F2 − ul1 −F1)
+ (1− νl)(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1)
= (1− 2δl)(ul2 − ul1)T (F2 −F1)− δl(F2 −F1)T (F2 −F1)
− (νl + δl − 1)(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1)
= (ul2 − ul1)T (F2 −F1)− δl
1− 2δl (F2 −F1)
T (F2 −F1)− νl + δl − 1
1− 2δl (ul2 − ul1)
T (ul2 − ul1)
where we have replaced Fi(uli, {Wl}) with Fi for simplicity. The above relation tells us that the feed-forward connection
from the input to the output degrades the robustness of the ResNet block. This is because for a ResNet block l to be stable
and robust, the following should hold for the Lyapunov parameters of the block excluding the feed-forward connection:
0 < δl <
1
2 and νl + δl > 1 where δl × νl < 0.25. So that the entire block can have the robustness properties: δ′l = νl+δl−11−2δl
and ν′l =
νl+δl−1
1−2δl . This means that to maintain robustness and stability for a ResNet block, one needs to enforce stricter
conditions on the Lyapunov design hyper-parameters of the sub-layers inside the block and consequently the spectral norm of
the weights during the training of the DNN. In a sense, this means that a ResNet block is less robust against adversarial attacks
in comparison to a simple feedforward or convolutional layer. This is expected because the output of a ResNet block consists of
the block’s output and the input signal fed into the block. This means that if the input signal is perturbed by adversarial noise,
then under this architecture, the adversarial noise can easily propagate to the output of the block and throughout the DNN. The
negative effects of feed-forward connections on robustness of nonlinear systems have been explored in control theory [22].
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E. Proof of Theorem 4
The input-output mapping of each layer can be represented as Ml = (ul2− ul1)T (yl2− yl1)− δl(yl2− yl1)T (yl2− yl1)−
νl(ul2 − ul1)T (ul2 − ul1) > 0 for layers l = 1, .., N , one needs to show that,
0 ≤
n∑
l=1
Ml ≤ (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1)− δ(y2 − y1)T (y2 − y1)− ν(ui2 − u1)T (u2 − u1).
The summation
∑n
l=1Ml is positive if the sub-layers are trained according to Theorem 3 and as a result one can show that
the above relation is equivalent to,
n∑
l=1
Ml − (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1) + δ(y2 − y1)T (y2 − y1) + ν(u2 − u1)T (u2 − u1) ≤ 0. (4)
We can define the following matrices,
A1 =

−ν1 0 . . . 0 − 12
1
2 −ν2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . 12 −νn 0
0 . . . 0 12 δ
 ,
and,
A2 =

ν 0 . . . 0 − 12
1
2 −δ1
. . . 0
0 12 −δ2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 12 −δn

.
As a result, (4) may be represented as,
[uT yT ](AT1 +A2)[u
T yT ]T = [uT yT ]A[uT yT ]T ,
where,
A = AT1 +A2 =

ν − ν1 12 0 . . . − 12
1
2 −δ1 − ν2 12 . . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . 12 −δn−1 − νn 12− 12 0 . . . 12 δ − δn
 .
According to Corollary 1, if −A is quasi-dominant, then−A is positive definite, which means that A is negative definite and
we have [uT yT ]A[uT yT ]T ≤ 0 and the relation given in (4) is met. As a result the DNN is instantaneously IIFOFP with indices
δ and ν. For this to hold, the only condition is for the hyper-parameters to be selected such that the matrix−A is quasi-dominant.
For the case that we are interested in, we need the hyper-parameters to be selected such that δ > 0, ν > 0 where δn > δ > 0
and ν1 > ν > 0, δi > 0 for i = 1, ..., n and νi for i = 1, ..., n are selected such that the matrix −A is quasi-dominant.
F. An example on how the Lyapunov parameters are selected
Here, we provide an example of parameter selection for the fully connected DNN used in some of our experiments with the
global Lyapunov property of δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24. For a 3 layer fully connected forward-net, the following Lyapunov hyper-
parameters should be selected: δ1, ν1 (ρ(W1)), δ2, ν2 (ρ(W2)), δ3, ν3 (ρ(W3)), which then determine the global Lyapunov
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properties: δ, ν. The following conditions should be met for the matrix−A to be quasi-dominant: ν < ν1, δ < δ3, δ1 +ν2 > 1,
δ2 + ν3 > 1. The matrix −A is:
−A =

ν1 − ν − 12 0 12− 12 δ1 + ν2 − 12 0
0 − 12 δ2 + ν3 − 12
1
2 0 − 12 δ3 − δ
 .
For δ = 1.0, we have a range of choices for δ3 (δ < δ3), we select δ3 = 1.08 which is a robust choice due to its relatively
large value (Subsection 4.3).This gives us the condition ν3 < 0.25/1.08 = 0.231, where ν3 = 0.23 is selected to meet the
condition. As a result, the allowed range for spectral regularization for the last layer is ρ(W3) < 1δ23 +
2|ν3|
δ3
= 1.283. In a
similar manner for ν = 0.24, we have a range of choices for ν1 (ν < ν1), we select ν1 = 0.27. This gives us the condition
δ1 < 0.25/0.27 = 0.925, where δ1 = 0.92 is selected to meet the condition. As a result, the allowed range for spectral
regularization of the first layer becomes ρ(W1) < 1δ21 +
2|ν1|
δ1
= 1.768. Lastly, the values of ν2 and δ2 should be selected such
that ν2 > 0.08 and δ2 > 0.769, we select δ2 = 0.78 which gives us ν2 = 0.32 and the spectral regularization range for the
second layer becomes, ρ(W2) < 1δ22 +
2|ν2|
δ2
= 2.464. For our experiment, we use cross-validation to select the following
spectral regularization set [1.76, 2.46, 1.01]. The matrix −A becomes,
−A =

0.03 − 12 0 12− 12 1.24 − 12 0
0 − 12 1.11 − 12
1
2 0 − 12 0.08
 ,
which is a quasi-dominant (diagonally dominant) matrix and positive definite with the spectral norm of 1.791 and Frobenius
norm of 2.185.
G. Proof of Corollary 2
Given Theorem 4, the definitions for the following vectors, ∆n = y2 − y1 representing the changes in the output of the
DNN, ∆1 = u1 +∆1−u1 representing the changes in the input of the DNN injected by the attacker and according to Theorem
3, we have,
0 ≤ ∆T1 ∆n −∆Tn δI∆n −∆T1 νI∆1
Given that δ > 0 and ν > 0, the above can be represented as,
0 ≤ ( 1
2δ
+ ν)||∆1||22 −
δ
2
||∆n||22
Finally, if we move the appropriate terms to the left side of the above inequalities we have,
||∆n||22 ≤ (
1
δ2
+
2ν
δ
)||∆1||22.
H. Experiment design and hyper-parameter details
This appendix includes all hyper-parameters used in the experiments. Please note that, each layer has their own δ and ν
associated with them. The pair (δ, ν) then determine the level of spectral regularization, given in parenthesis, enforced at
the layer during the training of network. The δ’s and ν’s are selected according to the conditions presented in Definition 2,
Theorem 1, Theorem 3, Theorem 4 and Corollary 1. The selections of the pairs (δ, ν) for the layers then lead to a global
Lyapunov pair (δ, ν) for the entire network which then later is used to present a specific network in the tables.
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H.1. The Lyapunov design parameters for Forward-Net (trained on the MNIST dataset)
Table 4: The hyper-parameters for the fully connected Forward-Net (3 layers of sizes [50, 20, 10]) used in the experiments
Forward-Net Layer 1 (linear) Layer 2 (linear) Layer 3 (linear)
Global Lyapunov
Property
Design
Parameters
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.) δ, ν
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(1.83)
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
(1.83)
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
(1.83) δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28
δ = 0.92, ν = 0.27
(1.76)
δ = 0.98, ν = 0.25
(1.55)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.26
(1.62) δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26
δ = 0.92, ν = 0.27
(1.76)
δ = 0.78, ν = 0.32
(2.46)
δ = 1.08, ν = 0.23
(1.01) δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24
N/A N/A N/A
None
(Base Training with Freb.
`2 reg., λ = 0.01)
N/A N/A N/A
None
(Base Training with Freb.
`2 reg., λ = 0.05)
N/A N/A N/A
None
(Base Training with Freb.
`2 reg., λ = 0.1)
H.2. The Lyapunov design parameters for AlexNet (trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset)
Table 5: The hyper-parameters for the AlexNet architecture used in the experiments
AlexNet: Layer 1 (conv.) Layer 2 (conv.) Layer 3 (conv.) Layer 4 (linear) Layer 5 (linear)
Global Lyapunov
Property
Design
Parameters
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.) δ, ν
δ = 0.74, ν = 0.33
(2.52)
δ = 0.74, ν = 0.33
(2.52)
δ = 0.74, ν = 0.33
(2.52)
δ = 0.74, ν = 0.33
(2.52)
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(2.02) δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(2.02)
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(2.02)
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(2.02)
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(2.02)
δ = 0.92, ν = 0.27
(1.76) δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
δ = 0.92, ν = 0.27
(1.76)
δ = 0.78, ν = 0.32
(2.46)
δ = 0.78, ν = 0.32
(2.46)
δ = 0.78, ν = 0.32
(2.46)
δ = 1.08, ν = 0.23
(1.01) δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
None
(Base training)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
None
(Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
None
(Training with spectral
reg. <1 for each layer)
H.3. The Lyapunov design parameters for the ResNet architecture (trained on the SVHN dataset)
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H.4. The Lyapunov design parameters for the ResNet50 architecture (trained on the ImageNet dataset)
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I. Experiment results
This appendix includes the experiment results for all the above architectures against FGM and Iterative PGD attacks. A pair
of results are presented per DNN for the cases where a DNN was trained with or without adversarial training.
I.1. The experiment results for the Forward-Net architecture (trained on the MNIST dataset)
Table 8: Experiment results for the FGM attack
Network Type Type of Attack Type of Training
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 FGM 0.966 0.953 0.934
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 FGM 0.962 0.951 0.935
δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 FGM 0.948 0.939 0.927
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
FGM 0.927 0.915 0.902
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
FGM 0.870 0.859 0.840
Base Training
with Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.1
FGM 0.816 0.809 0.797
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.971 0.965 0.954
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.966 0.956 0.950
δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.952 0.941 0.935
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.908 0.898 0.885
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.822 0.805 0.793
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.1
FGM
with `2 FGM
Training 0.592 0.593 0.576
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Table 9: Experiment results for the Iterative PGD attack (k=100)
Network Type Type of Attack Type of Training
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 PGD 0.966 0.953 0.933
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 PGD 0.962 0.951 0.934
δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 PGD 0.948 0.939 0.926
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
PGD 0.927 0.916 0.901
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
PGD 0.869 0.858 0.839
Base Training
with Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.1
PGD 0.815 0.809 0.796
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.970 0.963 0.954
δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.962 0.956 0.946
δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.950 0.943 0.933
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.639 0.633 0.625
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.113 0.113 0.113
Base Network with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.1
PGD
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.113 0.113 0.113
I.2. The experiment results for the AlexNet architecture (trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset)
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Figure 4: Accuracy of model under PGD attack with adversarial training (left) and under FGM attack with adversarial training
(right) using AlexNet on CIFAR10. Plots share the same legend, x-axis indicates the power of the attack .
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Table 10: Experiment results for the FGM attack
Network Type Type of Attack Type of Training
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40
δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29 FGM 0.745 0.708 0.659 0.612 0.565 0.515 0.469
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 FGM 0.733 0.705 0.678 0.644 0.609 0.573 0.536
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 FGM 0.721 0.698 0.669 0.639 0.606 0.575 0.539
Base Network FGM 0.729 0.680 0.620 0.563 0.508 0.458 0.424
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
FGM 0.409 0.407 0.405 0.404 0.397 0.394 0.391
δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.762 0.740 0.724 0.705 0.685 0.669 0.642
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.737 0.716 0.697 0.690 0.669 0.658 0.640
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.730 0.715 0.700 0.677 0.668 0.653 0.641
Base Network FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
FGM
with `2 FGM
Adv. Training 0.250 0.252 0.250 0.248 0.247 0.2478 0.246
Table 11: Experiment results for the Iterative PGD attack (k=100)
Network Type Type of Attack Type of Training
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40
δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29 PGD (k=100) 0.743 0.700 0.645 0.590 0.530 0.473 0.415
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 PGD (k=100) 0.731 0.702 0.672 0.633 0.591 0.545 0.504
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 PGD (k=100) 0.720 0.696 0.662 0.626 0.590 0.547 0.510
Base Network PGD (k=100) 0.730 0.672 0.608 0.541 0.478 0.419 0.367
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
PGD (k=100) 0.409 0.407 0.405 0.402 0.396 0.393 0.390
δ = 0.85, ν = 0.29 PGD (k=100)
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.762 0.740 0.715 0.691 0.672 0.650 0.626
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 PGD (k=100)
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.737 0.719 0.698 0.692 0.667 0.655 0.643
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 PGD (k=100)
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.731 0.705 0.698 0.680 0.667 0.649 0.634
Base Network PGD (k=100)
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.741 0.720 0.691 0.654 0.642 0.606 0.573
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
PGD (k=100)
with `2 PGD
Adv. Training 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
I.3. The experiment results for the ResNet architecture (trained on the SVHN dataset)
Table 12: Experiment results for the Iterative PGD attack (k=100)
Network Type Type of Attack Type of Training
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40
δ = 0.80, ν = 0.28 PGD (k=100) 0.869 0.814 0.746 0.674 0.607 0.545 0.486
δ = 0.91, ν = 0.26 PGD (k=100) 0.862 0.808 0.742 0.674 0.606 0.544 0.488
Base Network PGD (k=100) 0.850 0.783 0.711 0.631 0.565 0.493 0.431
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
PGD (k=100) 0.850 0.783 0.719 0.640 0.571 0.509 0.455
J. Robustness performance against the Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack
We tried our approach against the C&W attack. The parameters were chosen according to the tutorials presented in [27].
This appendix includes the results for this experiment.
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Table 13: C&W attack parameters: {learning rate: 0.001, initial const: 0.01, max iter: 500}
Network Type/Dataset Accuracy on the
adversarial dataset
Network Type/Dataset Accuracy on the
adversarial datasetAlexNet/Cifar-10 ForwardNet/MNIST
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29 0.302 δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 0.375
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 0.335 δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 0.466
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 0.332 δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 0.470
Base Network 0.265 Base Network 0.382
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
0.157
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
0.318
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1 for all layers 0.281
Table 14: C&W attack parameters: {learning rate: 0.0001, initial const: 0, max iter: 500}
Network Type/Dataset Accuracy on the
adversarial dataset
Network Type/Dataset Accuracy on the
adversarial datasetAlexNet/Cifar-10 ForwardNet/MNIST
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29 0.787 δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 0.970
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 0.755 δ = 0.95, ν = 0.26 0.975
δ = 1.07, ν = 0.22 0.740 δ = 1.0, ν = 0.24 0.951
Base Network 0.717 Base Network 0.934
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.01
0.407
Base Training with
Freb. `2 reg., λ = 0.05
0.872
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1 for all layers 0.441
K. Robustness performance comparison with prior spectral normalization approaches
This appendix details a set of experiments performed to provide a robustness comparison between our proposed approach
and the works given in [11], [28], [37] and [8]. [28], [11] propose training networks with the same spectral regularization
enforced across the entire network where ρ(Wl) ≤ β for l = 1, ..., n and β is a constant. We select 3 values of β from their
papers: β = 1.0, 1.6, 2.0. The 2 works given in [37] and [8] may be seen as subsets of the works given in [28] and [11],
where ρ(Wl) ≤ β for l = 1, ..., n and β = 1.0 are selected. All the aforementioned works are special cases of our proposed
Lyapunov robust solution. Our experiments confirm that our approach provides 3 main benefits that the other works do not
provide. 1- Our work provides the theory, reasoning and interpretation behind why spectral regularization enhances robustness,
and in particular how the spectral regularization hyper-parameters for each layer should be selected. 2- Our work provides a
higher level of flexibility and freedom in selecting the hyper-parameter for training based the interpretations and reasoning
behind our theory and work. 3- Our proposed approach produces trained DNNs that are more robust and perform better than
the other works in this area.
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Table 15: The hyper-parameters for the AlexNet architecture used in the experiments
AlexNet: Layer 1 (conv.) Layer 2 (conv.) Layer 3 (conv.) Layer 4 (linear) Layer 5 (linear)
Global Lyapunov
Property
Design
Parameters
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.)
δ, ν
(spect. norm reg.) δ, ν
δ = 0.81, ν = 0.30
(1.49)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.20
(1.49)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.20
(1.49)
δ = 0.70, ν = 0.35
(2.12)
δ = 0.80, ν = 0.23
(3.14) δ = 0.79, ν = 0.29
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(1.59)
δ = 0.86, ν = 0.29
(1.89)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.26
(1.62)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.26
(1.62)
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
(2.81) δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28
δ = 0.88, ν = 0.28
(1.59)
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28
(1.89)
δ = 0.76, ν = 0.32
(2.52)
δ = 0.96, ν = 0.26
(1.62)
δ = 0.91, ν = 0.27
(1.80) δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
N/A, N/A
(1.0)
None
(Training with spectral
reg. <1.0 across all layers)
N/A, N/A
(1.6)
N/A, N/A
(1.6)
N/A, N/A
(1.6)
N/A, N/A
(1.6)
N/A, N/A
(1.6)
None
(Training with spectral
reg. <1.6 across all layers)
N/A, N/A
(2.0)
N/A, N/A
(2.0)
N/A, N/A
(2.0)
N/A, N/A
(2.0)
N/A, N/A
(2.0)
None
(Training with spectral
reg. <2.0 across all layers)
Table 16: Experiment results for the FGM attack
Network Type Type of Attack
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40
δ = 0.79, ν = 0.29 FGM 0.720 0.704 0.678 0.646 0.614 0.579 0.547
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 FGM 0.722 0.701 0.676 0.647 0.613 0.583 0.550
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 FGM 0.721 0.703 0.703 0.643 0.609 0.578 0.548
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1 across all layers FGM 0.437 0.436 0.432 0.430 0.427 0.425 0.419
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1.6 across all layers FGM 0.665 0.656 0.635 0.614 0.589 0.562 0.538
Base Training with
spec. reg. <2.0 across all layers FGM 0.719 0.701 0.673 0.641 0.608 0.569 0.534
Table 17: Experiment results for the Iterative PGD attack (k=100)
Network Type Type of Attack
Accuracy on the Adversarial Test Dataset
(Attack Strength )
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40
δ = 0.79, ν = 0.29 PGD 0.720 0.703 0.671 0.635 0.599 0.556 0.520
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 PGD 0.722 0.698 0.670 0.638 0.598 0.563 0.523
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 PGD 0.721 0.701 0.670 0.633 0.593 0.557 0.522
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1 across all layers PGD 0.437 0.436 0.432 0.430 0.427 0.425 0.419
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1.6 across all layers PGD 0.665 0.654 0.633 0.611 0.580 0.554 0.522
Base Training with
spec. reg. <2.0 across all layers PGD 0.717 0.696 0.667 0.629 0.587 0.543 0.500
Table 18: The test accuracy of the DNNs after training
Network Type
Test Accuracy
on the Clean Dataset Network Type
Test Accuracy
on the Clean Dataset
δ = 0.79, ν = 0.29 0.74
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1 across all layers 0.44
δ = 0.89, ν = 0.28 0.74
Base Training with
spec. reg. <1.6 across all layers 0.68
δ = 0.90, ν = 0.27 0.74
Base Training with
spec. reg. <2.0 across all layers 0.74
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L. Further details on the experiments
We validate our results by training several 3-layer fully connected forward-nets on the MNIST data set using the Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. Further, we train several AlexNet architectures on the CIFAR10 data set using
Stochastic Gradient Descent optimization with a learning rate of 0.01 and momentum of 0.9. Additionally, we train several
ResNet architectures on the SVHN data set and ResNet50 architectures on the Imagenet data set using Stochastic Gradient
Descent optimization with a learning rate of 0.01 and momentum of 0.9. All networks are trained for 200 epochs. The pixel
values for the input images are normalized to take values in [−0.5,+0.5]. When considering the baseline defense of weight
decay (i.e., `2 regularized weights) networks, we performed cross-validation to select λ ∈ [0.01, 0.05, 0.1]. The parameters for
our robust Lyapunov approach for each network architecture used in the experiments are specified in Appendix H. Baseline
represents a DNN with no regularization enforced during training.
All experiments were performed on a single Nvidia Tesla V100-SXM2-16GB GPU. The MNIST data set was downloaded
from http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/. The data is randomly divided into the training, testing and validation
data sets of size: 60000, 10000 and 5000 receptively. The CIFAR10 data set was downloaded from https://www.cs.
toronto.edu/˜kriz/cifar.html. The data is randomly divided into the training, testing and validation data sets of
size: 45000, 10000 and 5000 receptively. The SVHN data set was downloaded from http://ufldl.stanford.edu/
housenumbers/. The data is randomly divided into the training, testing and validation data sets of size: 73257, 26032 and
500 receptively. The ImageNet data set was downloaded from http://image-net.org/download. No sample was
excluded.
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